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CHAPTER6 
Apple of Gold in a Picture of Silver: 
The Constitution and Liberty 
Allen C. Guelzo 
I 
I n the threatening winter of 1861, as the United States was being ~ inched ever- closer td the outbreak of civil war by the secession of the Southern states over the issue of black slavery, the newly elected president, Abraham Lincoln, opened up a confidential 
correspondence with a f6rmer Southern political colleague, Alexander 
Stephens of Georgia. Stephens had made headlines in November 1860, 
in a speech to the Georgia legislature, urging Georgia not to follow tlie 
South into secession. Lincoln sent him a friendly note, asking- for a 
printed copy of the speech-and perhaps warming Stephens to an invi-
tation to come into Lincoln's cabinet as a gesture of mollification to-
ward the South. Stephens wrote back, apologizing that the speech was 
not yet in print (apart from the newspaper reports of it that Lincoln had 
read), but taking the opportunity to urge Lincoln to make some kind of 
conciliatory promise to the South about staying within the bounds of 
the Constitution, as president, and not threatening to take federal ac-
tion against slavery in the South, where slavery had enjoyed a kind of 
constitutional immunity since the beginnings of the Republic. This, 
Stephens believed, would deflate the secession fire-eaters better than any 
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cabinet offer, adding (with a phrase borrowed from the Book of 
Proverbs), "A word fitly spoken by you now would be like 'apple of 
gold in a picture of silver.'" 
Lincoln was disappointed that Stephens seemed to think that he in-
tended some unconstitutional aggression against the South. The presi-
dent-elect could not believe that conciliatory words from him about the 
Constitution were really necessary: "Do the people of the South really 
entertain fears that a Republican administration would, directly, or in-
directly, interfere with their slaves, or with them, about their slaves?" 
The correspondence died on that point of mutual misunderstanding, 
and Stephens, rather than entering Lincoln's cabinet, eventually became 
vice-president of the new Southern Confederacy in February 1861. 
(And nine years later, Stephens would compare Lincoln to Caesar, the 
' destroyer of the Roman republic, and claim that "I do not think he un-
derstood" the niceties of constitutional government "or the tendencies 
of his acts upon them") .1 
But Stephens's anxiety about Lincoln's potential for breaking over 
the limits of the Constitution stayed in the forefront of Lincoln's think-
ing, like an irritation he could not rub out. So did the biblical image 
about apples of gold and pictures of silver, for in January Lincoln 
, wrote out a brief statement on the place of the Constitution in his 
thinking, perhaps as part of a reply to Stephens, in which Lincoln bor-
rowed precisely Stephens's own image about apples of gold. "Without 
' the Constitution and the Union, we could not have attained ... our 
great prosperity," Lincoln acknowledged, and therefore he had no in-
tention of treating the Constitution lightly. But "there is something 
back of these, entwining more closely about the human heart," Lincoln 
insisted, "That something is the principle of 'Liberty to all' that is en-
shrined in the Declaration of' Independence, that 'all men are created 
equal."' This was a principle that, for Lincoln, slashed straight across 
the practice of slavery, and if Stephens expected him to pay attention 
only to the Constitution and ignore the principles that lay "back of 
these," he would have nothing to expect but disappointment in Lin-
coln. The Constitution did not exist merely for its own sake, as though 
it were only a set of procedural rules with no better goal than letting 
people do what they pleased with what they pleased; it was intended to 
serve the interests of "the principle of 'Liberty to all,"' which meant 
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that the Declaration was "the word, 'fitly spoken' which has proved an 
'apple of gold' to us." The Constitution, and the federal Union the 
Constitution created in 1787, 
are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture was 
made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve 
it. The picture was made for the apple-not the apple for the picture.2 
There _is no doubt but that the Declaration of Independence was the 
central statement of Lincoln's political idealism. "I believe that the dec-
laration that 'all men are created equal' is the great fundamental princi-
ple upon which our free institutions rest," he wrote in 1858; and two 
months after his correspondence with Stephens, at Philadelphia's Inde-
pendence Hall, Lincoln declared that "I have never had a feeling politi-
cally that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declara-
tion of Independence." What he hated about the enslavement of blacks 
was not only its crass disregard of the natural equality of all human be-
ings, but the way it forced "so many really good men amongst; us into 
an open war with the ... Declaration of Independence, and· insisting 
that there is no right principle of action but self-interest." And it was 
the Declaration's promise of equality that Lincoln made the chapter and 
verse of his great call for a "new birth of freedom" in his most memo-
rable public speech, the Gettysburg Address. 3 
But this was precisely what, at bottom, divided Lincoln and Alexan-
der Stephens. For Stephens, the Declaration was a great mistak,e; and 
the Constitution was indeed a set of procedural rules, intended to teach 
no particular system of political morality, or any other morality for that 
matter. "The prevailing ideas ... at the time of the formation of the old 
Constitution were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation 
of the laws of nature," Stephens said on March 21, 1861. "Thos-e ideas; 
however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption 
of the equality of races. This was an error." And resting the Constitu-
tion on the Declaration was the equivalent of building the national 
house on "a sandy foundation." 4 
And there have been, long after Stephens and even among Lincoln's 
admirers, those who have wondered whether Stephens was right, or at 
\ 
least right in apprehending that Lincoln had taken entirely too cavalier 
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verse of his great call for a "new birth of freedom" in his most memo-
rable public speech, the Gettysburg Address. 3 
But this was precisely what, at bottom, divided Lincoln and Alexan-
der Stephens. For Stephens, the Declaration was a great mistake; and 
the Constitution was indeed a set of procedural rules, intended to teach 
no particular system of political morality, or any other morality for that 
matter. "The prevailing ideas ... at the time of the formation of the old 
Constitution were, that the enslavement of the~African was in violation 
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an attitude toward the Constitution. According to the conservative po-
litical scientist Willmoore Kendall, Lincoln did not merely set the Decla-
ration and the Constitution into what he imagined was a proper rela-
tionship of apples of gold and pictures of silver; he used the Declaration 
to demolish the Constitution in the name of his own egalitarian ideol-
ogy. "What Lincoln did ... was to falsify the facts of history, and to do 
so in a way that precisely confuses our self-understanding as a people," 
Kendall argued. Gottfried Dietze, a political conservative like Kendall, 
saw Lincoln's appeal to the Declaration as the "apple of gold" as a 
democratic pretense that allowed him to demote the Constitution to a 
mere piece of framery, so that Lincoln would be free to pursue dictato-
rial glory as president. Lincoln, said Dietze, was "a democratic Machi-
avellian whose latent desire to achieve immortality broke forth at the 
first opportunity offered by ... the Civil War." Or if not glory, Lincoln 
used the pursuit of equality as an excuse for granting himself "unprece-
dented and virt11:ally dictatorial powers as president," and so tear down 
the restraints of the Constitution so that he could satisfy a kind of polit-
ical Oedipus complex. According to Dwight G. Anderson, Lincoln 
would use the appeal to equality in the Declaration in order to "put 
himself in Washington's place as the father of his country." For Ander-
son, Lincoln as president only posed as a defender and maintainer of 
the Union and the Constitution, while in reality "he actually was trans-
forming it. "5 
And even among Lincoln's admirers, there is a running current of dis-
comfort at Lincoln's apparent willingness to set the Constitution below 
the Declaration. The great Lincoln biographer, James G. Randall, the 
equally great historian James Ford Rhodes, and the path-breaking politi-
cal historian William Dunning all agreed that Lincoln rode roughshod 
over the Constitution in pursuit of dictatorial powers, although they were 
ql.lick to add that Lincoln's "wholesome regard for individual liberty" 
and "the legal-mindedness of the American people" kept him from turn-
ing into an outright tyrant. More recently, voices on the political left like 
Garry Wills, Charles L. Black, and Mark Tushnet have actually ap-
plauded Lincoln for dumping the Constitution in favor of the Declara-
tion. According to Wills, the Gettysburg Address, by invoking the Decla-
ration of Independence at the beginning rather than the Constitution, 
changed "the recalcitrant stuff of that legal compromise, bringing it to its 
THE LINCOLN ENIGMA 
own indictment." At Gettysburg, Lincoln performed "one of the most 
daring acts of open-air slight-of-hand ever witnessed by the unsuspect-
ing" and "changed the way people thought about the Constitution." 
(Willmore Kendall, in Wills's reading, was actually quite right: Wills 
merely chose to cheer what Kendall chose to deplore). Howard Jones 
echoes Wills's judgment by describing the war as "an instrument" Lin- , 
coin used "for reshaping the Union of the Constitution into the more per-
fect Union envisioned by signers of the Declaration of Independence." 
Even Phillip Paludan, who offers the most-realistic and persuasive middle 
path between Kendall and Wills, can only insist that Lincoln was indeed a 
Declaration-of-Independence egalitarian, but a process egalitarian who 
believed "that equality would be realized only through the proper opera-
tion of existing institutions. "6 
What runs as a common thread through all of these comments, fa-
vorable and unfavorable alike, is the peculiar sense that, in varying de-
grees and for good or ill, Lincoln really does represent a sacrifice of the 
Constitution to the Declaration. Lincoln's own image of the "apples of 
gold in the picture of silver" has offered easily quotable support for that, 
since it suggests all too broadly that the Constitution's importance is 
largely that of an instrument for implementing the Declaration's ideals. 
As Lincoln said to a political rally in June 1858: "be ever true to Liberty, 
the Union, and the Constitution-true to Liberty, not selfishly, but upon 
principle-not for special classes of men, but for all men, true to the 
union and the Constitution, as the best means to advance that liberty. "7 
Did Lincoln sit at the other extreme from Alexander Stephens, and did 
he regard the Constitution as a wax nose, to be reshaped according to 
his own egalitarian idealism? If either Wills or Kendall are even close to 
being right, the answer would have to be yes, to both questions. 
The difficulty with resting"in this opinion is that we still live under 
this Constitution, and the Civil War was fought to keep it in place; and 
very nearly all the advances in civil equality made in this century have 
been based on appeals to the Constitution. Certainly, no civil rights lit-
igation has achieved success by ignoring the Constitution and c\jrecting 
judges' attention to the Declaration. Casting Lincoln as both Wills and 
Kendall do-as a subverter of the Constitution-makes Lincoln into a 
sort of political monster rather than a hero. So what did Lincoln in-
tend when he spoke of the Constitution as a "picture of silver"? Ana 
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before we confidently conclude that Lincoln had to tear down the Con-
stitution in order to pave the way for equality, what did Lincoln mean 
by equality? ·For it may turn out that Lincoln was more of a constitu-
tionalist than meets the eye, and a very different sort of egalitarian 
than we think. 
II 
It is surprising that Abraham Lincoln, a lawyer's lawyer, would find 
himself defining the relationship of the Declaration and the Constitu-
tion in terms of illustrations and pictures rather than a precise legal 
equation. But Lincoln was not the only one with that problem. This 
was because there was no simple consensus in the American Republic as 
a whole about how the Constitution was supposed to function, and 
nowhere was that more dramatically demonstrated than in the fero-
cious political contests between the Democratic party of Andrew Jack-
son and Stephen A. Douglas, and the Whig party of Henry Clay and 
Abraham Lincoln. 
Born in the great political triumph of Thomas Jefferson and his fol-
lowers in the presidential election of 1800, the Democratic party saw it-
self as the party of a virtuous countryside, a party of independent 
landowners who would keep liberty pure by preventing the fledgling 
American merchant class from concentrating too much lethal political 
power in its own hands. For the Democrats, the Constitution was a 
procedural rulebook, and for the most part, only a procedural rule-
book. It prescribed only the minimum of guidelines for public life and 
left the balance to the self-government of American individuals. It both-
ered the Democrats not at all if those self-governing individuals gal-
loped off in a hundred different cultural and moral directions. Any at-
tempt to prescribe a common cultural standard not only stepped 
beyond the Constitution, but amounted to a conspiratorial concentra-
tion of power. "So long as the individual trespasses upon none of the 
rights of others, or throws no obstacle in the way of their free and full 
exercise," wrote Orestes Brownson, "government, law, public opinion 
even, must leave him free to take his own course."8 
This heady brand of do-your-own-thing populism (made all the head-
ier by the leadership, first, of Jefferson, and then of Andrew Jackson) had 
THE LINCOLN ENIGMA 
two basic flaws: nations of landowners tend not to do well if they are ever 
sucked into war with nations of merchants; and, landowners (far from 
being always virtuous) can just as often be suspicious, provincial~ and 
lecherous. The first of those flaws showed up in the War of 1812, when 
radical Jeffersonians led by Henry Clay brought the United States into a 
war in which the American Republic came within an ace of having its ill-
equipped and underweight armies of farmers wiped out by the British. 
Clay, the sadder but wiser politician, backed away from Jefferson and 
began insisting that, if the United States wanted its liberty to survive, it 
had better investigate the acquisition of a little power-and so Clay cre-
ated the Whig party to promote a national banking system to encourage 
commercial development (and a national tariff to protect it) and a general 
combination of business and government in joint effort. 
This enraged Democrats. "Our plan may be stated in a phrase of 
the utmost brevity," erupted Democratic journalist William Leggett, 
"for it consists merely in the absolute separation of government from 
the banking and credit system." Clay's so-called American System for 
the promotion of commerce and industry would only lay open the path , 
to frightening accumulations of power, both inside and outside the : 
government. Once accumulated, that economic power could then be 
used in political ways-to buy votes for public works projects that 
benefited the powerful, to finance campaigns for the imposition of ' 
evangelical Protestant morality on the working class (like the New 
York City religious revivals underwritten by the wealthy Whig mer-
chants, Arthur and Lewis Tappan), and, even more threatening, to 
back movements for the abolition of black slavery (which the Tappans 
were also financing). To Democrats like Leggett, such concentrations 
of power, and the capacity for social mischief they created, were wildly 
unconstitutional. The Constitution nowhere gave any sanction to pro-
posal for national banks, national roads, or national meddling with 
slavery-at least not explicitly.9 
But explicitly was just Clay's point-what the Constitution did not 
expressly forbid was not unconstitutional, and so hey-ho for the Na-
tional Bank. Add to this the guidance given to American jurisprudence 
by Joseph Story and James Kent in favor of absolutizing contract law 
and inhibiting state restraints on commerce, and the breakup of state 
restrictions on banking and interstate business supervised by Chief Jus-
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tice John Marshall and the Marshall court, and the way was open to 
"constitutionalizing" the entire .field of domestic economic policy. In-
stead of the Constitution enjoying a sacred consensus above mere 
policy disputes, the Constitution in the early republic became the site of 
every one of those disputes.10 
The second flaw in the Democratic reasoning-the unreliability of 
rural virtue-,-was something with which Abraham Lincoln was all too 
well acquainted. "I presume I am not expected to employ the time as-
signed me, in the mere flattery of the farmers, as a class," Lincoln 
warned the Wisconsin State Agricultural Fair when he was invited to 
speak there in 1859. "I believe there really are more attempts at flatter-
ing them than any other; the reason of which I cannot perceive, unless it 
be that they can cast more votes than any other." Born in rural Ken-
tucky poverty to the very model of independent Democratic farmers, 
Lincoln disliked agricultural work and everything .attached to it almost 
from the beginning; and as soon as he came of age in Illinois, he left the 
farm for the town and the city and never looked back, to become a 
storekeeper and then a lawyer, two professions that were the point 
guards for American commercial development. It was this that made 
Lincoln a Whig from the start and drove him into politics (even before 
law), and which made "the name of Henry Clay ... an inspiration to 
me." It also determined Lincoln's view of the Constitution, and, as we 
shall see, gave his understanding of the Declaration an unexpectedly 
economic twist.11 
It is only if we suppose that Lincoln thought of nothing but the De-
claration-only if we ignore his immersion as a highly partisan Whig in 
the 1830s and 1840s, along with the general propensity of all political 
partisans then to "constitutionalize" policy debates-that we will be 
surprised to find Lincoln closely preoccupied with the integrity of the 
Constitution far earlier than with the Declaration of Independence. For 
despite the suggestions of some of his critics, Lincoln in the 1840s de-
voted more attention to the interpretation of the Constitution, and to a 
far more restrained notion of the Constitutional interpretation at that, 
than Wills, Kendall, or Randall claimed. His earliest extended political 
statement, the Springfield Young Men's Lyceum Address on "The Per-
petuation of Our Political Institutions" (from January 1838), closes 
with a ringing denunciation of the role of "passion" in politics (and 
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passion was understood to be the Democratic style, as opposed to Whig 
"reason") and a call for "general intelligence, [sound] morality and, in 
particular, a reverence for the constitution and laws." In 1848, as a 
Congressman advocating Clay's programs of tax-supported "internal 
Improvements," Lincoln attacked proposals to amend the Constitution 
as a mistake leading to ruin: 
No slight occasion should tempt us to touch it. Better not take the first 
step, which may lead to a habit of altering it. Better, rather, habituate 
ourselves to think of it, as unalterable. It can scarcely be made better 
than it is. New provisions, would introduce new difficulties, and thus 
create, and increase appetite for still further change. No sir, let it stand 
as it is. New hands have never touched it. The men who made it, have 
done their work, and have passed away. Who shall improve, on what 
they did?12 
Of course, as a Whig, he was more inclined to grant exceptions to 
this stiffness in handling the Constitution when it came to the pet proj-
ects of the Whig party. Participating in his first national political cam-
paign in 1840 as a Whig speechmaker, Lincoln attacked the Democrats' 
successful dismemberment of the national banking system under An-
drew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, a dissolution grounded in Jack-
son's claim that the Constitution gave no express sanction to a national 
bank. "As a sweeping objection to a National Bank ... it often has 
been urged, and doubtless will be again, that such a bank is unconstitu-
tional," Lincoln told a Springfield audience in December 1839. "Our 
opponents say, there is no express authority in the Constitution to es-
tablish a bank," Lincoln observed, but as a good Whig, he replied, 
"The Constitution enumerates expressly several powers which Con-
gress may exercise, superadded to which is a general authority to make 
'all laws necessary and proper,' for carrying into effect all the powers 
vested by the Constitution of the Government of the United States." A 
national banking system was as good a means of satisfying that need as 
any of the simple substitutes the Democrats were proposing; therefore, 
on Lincoln's expansive logic, "is it not clearly within the constitutional 
power of Congress to do so?"13 
But this only meant that he read the Constitution as a Whig might 
read it, not that he had no regard for it whatsoever. Far from it: his first 
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brief sliver of national notoriety was his attempt to force President Polk 
to reveal his own constitutional high-handedness in triggering the Mex-
ican War, riding roughshod over "the provision of the Constitution giv-
ing the war-making power to Congress." In 1852, he had actually criti-
cized the campaigners for an immediate abolition of slavery as the 
enemies of constitutional government. "Those who would shiver into 
fragments the union of these States; tear to tatters its now venerated 
constitution; and even burn the last copy of the Bible, rather than slav-
ery should continue a single hour," Lincoln said in a eulogy for the re-
cently deceased Henry Clay, "together with all their more halting sym-
pathizers, have received and are receiving their just execration. "14 
But as a Whig, he was also inclined to read the Constitution as 
more than merely a procedural document, which secured liberty but re-
fused to do more than express neutrality on what was done with that 
liberty. The same spirit in the Whigs that looked to create a powerful 
economic republic also looked to sponsor a powerful spirit of national-
ism, which would triumph in the creation of a single American national 
identity rather than a diversity of local, regional, or state identities. "I 
wish to be no less than National in all the positions I may take," he 
wrote in 1854. What Lincoln found great in Henry Clay, as he said in 
1852, was that "Whatever he did, he did for the whole country .... 
Feeling, as he did, and as the truth surely is, that the world's best hope 
depended on the continued Union of these States, he was ever jealous 
of, and watchful for, whatever might have the slightest tendency to sep-
arate them." And taken one step further, the Whigs also encouraged the 
creation of unified concepts of public morality, and attracted large-scale 
support from Protestant evangelicals who feared that the Democrats, in 
the name of personal liberty, had simply become the party of moral in-
difference to right and wrong. 15 
Lincoln never professed very much in the way of religion; but al-
most as a way of compensating for his lack of religious profile, he 
cultivated an unbending moral uprightness that won him the reputa-
tion, which has come down even to our times, as what his Springfield 
law partner William Herndon called "a safe counselor, a good 
lawyer, and an honest man in all the walks of life." And it was his 
moralism that led him into conflict, after 1854, with slavery. Lin-
coln's opposition to slavery always had strong moral overtones. "I 
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have always hated slavery," he declared in his great debates with 
Douglas in 1858; and in 1854, he explained, "I object to it because it 
assumes that there CAN be MORAL RIGHT in the enslaving of one 
man by another. " 16 
Lincoln did not articulate just what constituted the basis of that 
moral outrage. (As Southern defenders of slavery delighted to point out, 
the Bible was singularly silent on condemning slavery, so it would be dif-
ficult for him to find a source for antislavery moralism there). Certainly, 
one part of this moral loathing for slavery was Lincoln's tendency to as-
sociate slaveholding with low-life, nouveau riche forms of loose moral 
living. He once told a political ally that slavery "was the most glittering 
ostentatious and displaying property in the world" and was "highly se-
ductive to the thoughtless and giddy headed young men who looked 
upon work as vulgar and ungentlemanly." And in his 1842 Temperance 
Society Address in Springfield, Lincoln spoke of the "victory" of Reason 
arriving only "when there shall be neither a slave nor a drunkard on the 
earth"-implying that slavery and drunkenness were twins. 17 
Another, larger claim for moral indignation was that slavery violated 
natural law. "The ant who has toiled and dragged a crumb to his nest, 
will furiously defend the fruit of his labor, against whatever robber as-
sails him," Lincoln wrote in 1854. Slavery, which robbed the slave of the 
fruit of his labor, was just as much an outrage on the part of the human 
laborer. This was "so plain, that the most dumb and stupid slave that 
ever toiled for a master, does constantly know he is wronged." And even 
if the Bible had nothing explicit to say against slavery, Lincoln believed 
that natural theology did. "I think that if anything can be proved by nat-
ural theology, it is that slavery is morally wrong."18 
But above all, slavery violated the spirit of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, and it was in this context-as a contradiction of the secular ' 
morality of the Declaration of Independence-that the Declaration first 
begins to assume, in the 1850s, a significant place in Lincoln's rhetoric. 
"To us it appears natural to think that slaves are human beings; men, 
not property," Lincoln said in New Haven in 1860, "that some of the 
things, at least, stated about men in the declaration of independence 
apply to them as well as to us." In that case, the enslavement of blacks 
was a step away from the moral road of the Declaration, and a step · 
away from liberty and toward the enslavement of everyone. "Then we 
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may truly despair of the universality of freedom, or the efficacy of those 
sacred principles enunciated by our fathers-and give in our adhesion 
to the perpetuation and unlimited extension of slavery." Slavery was a 
moral spot on the garment of freedom as laid down in the Declaration. 
"Our republican robe is soiled, and trailed in the dust," he said in 1854 
in the tones of a parson demanding repentance from his flock: "Let us 
repurify it. Let us turn and wash it white, in the spirit, if not the blood 
of the Revolution .... Let us readopt the Declaration of Independence, 
and with it, the practices, and policy, which harmonize with it." Only 
that will save the Republic from the embarrassment of slavery; and in 
that case, "we shall have so saved it, that the succeeding millions of free 
happy people, the world over, shall rise up, and call us blessed, to the 
latest generation. " 19 
The standard Democratic response was to point out that, morality 
and the Declaration notwithstanding, the Constitution sanctioned slav-
ery, left it untouched in the States where it was legal, and maybe even 
untouchable everywhere else, too. As legal historian Paul Finkelman 
has remarked, "The word 'slavery' was never mentioned in the Consti-
tution, yet its presence was felt everywhere." The slaveholding states 
were granted extra representation in Congress based on a census count 
of three-fifths of their slave populations; recovery of slave runaways-
euphemistically described as persons "held to Service or Labour"-was 
made a matter of interstate comity throughout the Union; the Atlantic 
slave trade was guaranteed existence for 20 years; and the Constitu-
tion's prohibition on export duties gave granted unearned favors to 
slave-based agricultural products. 20 
Some of the most extreme Southern Democrats argued that the De-
claration not only had nothing to do with the Constitution, but it had 
actually been a philosophical mistake for the United States to adopt 
such ideas in its founding documents. Northern Democrats, like Lin-
coln's great Illinois rival, Stephen A. Douglas, would not go so far as to 
reject the Declaration out of hand, but they would argue that the Dec-
laration's ideas about freedom and equality applied only to white peo-
ple. "In my opinion the Signers of the Declaration of Independence 
had no reference whatever to the negro, when they declared all men to 
have been created equal," Douglas remarked in the great debates of 
1858. And this left him free to deal with the Constitution purely as a 
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procedural document that made no claims to any moral judgments 
whatsoever. It was not that Douglas actually favored slavery; it was 
that he believed that the rights of black people were "a question which 
each State in this union must decide for itself." This was because "our 
government was formed on the principle of diversity in the local insti-
tutions and laws, not that of uniformity. "21 
The response of many antislavery Whigs in the 1840s and Republi-
cans in the 1850s was to concede this point and flee from the Constitu-
tion to the Declaration as some sort of alternative standard of govern-
ment.22 And for Lincoln, too, the Declaration surfaces in the 1850s as a 
vital authority to appeal to when Democrats reached out to white racial 
prejudice as a way of silencing Northern unease with slavery. But Lin-
coln showed no sign that he believed the Constitution now had to be 
reshelved to a lower point, or that he had ever believed other than that 
the Constitution was a moral document, with moral implications about 
liberty and equality that coincided perfectly with the Declaration. 
As the image of the apple of gold and the picture of silver indicates, 
Lincoln believed that the Declaration and the Constitution needed 
each other. The Declaration was a statement of foundational natural 
rights, and natural rights that were shared everywhere by every human 
being. But it was not, and could not be, a statement about civil or po-
litical rights, which were a different thing altogether. "I have said that I 
do not understand the Declaration to mean that all men were created 
equal in all respects"-the details of specific civil and political rights 
were up to each community to grant. And the granting of such rights 
was very much a power left to the states in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, within the very general framework of the federal Constitution. 
Even up through the last weeks of his life, Lincoln was reluctant to 
commit the federal government to a national statement about' black 
civil rights, because the Constitution gave the federal government no 
power to delimit those rights. (Not that Lincoln had no concern for 
black civil rights: this is why he delicately pestered reconstruction gov-
ernors like Michael Hahn to enfranchise the freedmen, because civil 
rights like the franchise were understood, before the Reconstruction 
Amendments, to be the proper constitutional bailiwick of the states:) 
But in the basic natural rights that belonged to everyone, Lincoln be-
lieved that blacks and white alike shared a common, equal ground that 
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forever forbade one race from enslaving the other. "Though it does not 
declare that all men are equal in their attainments or social position, 
yet no sane man will attempt to deny that the African upon his own 
soil has all the natural rights that instrument vouchsafes to all 
mankind." And in no case was that natural equality more evident than 
in the case of economic rights. Every man, "in the right to put into his 
mouth the bread that his own hands have earned ... is the equal of 
every other man, white or black. "23 
This did not mean, however, that the Declaration and the Constitu-
tion were two entirely different sorts of document, the one strictly 
about ideas and the other strictly about technical process. A close read-
ing of the historical context of the Constitution would demonstrate 
that the Constitution was animated by the same moral commitment to 
liberty as the Declaration. True, the Constitution gave some measure 
of legal sanction to slavery, but this was only because the choice in 
1787 was between making those concessions and getting a national 
Constitution, or a descent into national anarchy and misrule; and only 
because the authors who made those concessions made them in the ex-
pectation that slavery would gradually die out anyway on its own. 
"You may examine the debates under the Constitution and in the first 
session of Congress and you will not find a single man saying that 
Slavery is a good thing," Lincoln wrote in 1859, "They all believed it 
was an evil." 24 
Whatever immunities the Constitution originally conferred upon 
slavery, "I believe that the right of property in a slave is not distinctively 
and expressly affirmed in the constitution." For instance: "There was 
nothing said in the Constitution relative to the spread of slavery in the 
Territories, but the same generation of men said something about it in 
[the] ordinance of [17]87," the Northwest Ordinance that restricted the 
spread of slavery into the old Northwest Territory. What was more, 
"they placed a provision in the Constitution which they supposed 
would gradually remove the disease by cutting off its source. This was 
the abolition of the slave trade," once the initial 20-year sanction for it 
had expired: 
a European, be he ever so intelligent, if not familiar with our institu-
tions, might read the Constitution over and over again and never 
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learn that Slavery existed in the United States. The reason is this. The 
Framers of the Organic Law believed that he Constitution would 
outlast Slavery and they did not want a word there to tell future gen-
erations that Slavery had ever been legalized in America.25 
Lincoln did not feel any necessity for se_tting the Constitution and 
the Declaration in tension with each other because he supposed that the 
common intentions of their common authors on the point of equality 
and liberty spoke sufficiently well for themselves. And this, he ex-
plained, was why he had not stepped forward as an antislavery partisan 
before 1854 and the adopting of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, permitting 
the extension of slavery into the western territories. "I have always 
hated it, but I have always been quiet about it until this new era of the 
introduction of the Nebraska bill began. I always believed that every-
body was against it, and that it was in the course of ultimate extinc-
tion .... The adoption of the Constitution and its attendant history led 
the people to believe so." The "theory of our government is Universal 
Freedom," Lincoln said in 1854, "'All men are created free and equal,' 
says the Declaration of Independence. The word 'Slavery' is not found 
in the Constitution. "26 
And so he continued to believe. Unlike many fellow Republicans, 
Lincoln would not demand an end to the obnoxious provisions of the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, because however much he disliked the oper-
ation of it, it was guaranteed to the South under the Constitution. As 
Lincoln wrote Joshua Speed in 1855, "I confess I hate to see the pqor 
creatures hunted down, and caught, and carried back to their stripes, 
and unrewarded toils." But "I also acknowledge your rights and my ob-
ligations, under the constitution, in regard to your slaves," and he 
wanted Speed to appreciate "how much the great body of the Northern 
people to crucify their feelings; in order to maintain their loyalty to the 
constitution and the Union." Lincoln declared at the end of the Lincoln-
Douglas debates, "I have neither assailed, nor wrestled with any part of 
the constitution. The legal right of the Southern people to reclaim their 
fugitives I have constantly admitted. The legal right of Congress to inter-
fere with the institution in these states, I have constantly denied." In 
1859, he actually advised Salmon Chase to restrain the Ohio state Re-
publican committee from asking for a repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law to 
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be included in the 1860 Republican national campaign platform. "The 
U.S. Constitution declares that a fugitive slave 'shall be delivered up."'27 
But to argue from that premise that the Constitution somehow gave 
slavery the broad right to plant itself in new areas, and sprout new do-
minions for itself under the shelter of Douglas's argument that the Consti-
tution made no moral judgments about what people did in those new do-
minions, was actually a denial of the whole intention of the Constitution. 
Even when the infamous Dred Scott decision in 1857 seemed to suggest 
that the Constitution actually did protect the extension of slavery into the 
territories, Lincoln refused to see it as any reason to surrender confidence 
in the ultimate justice of the Constitution. In his mind, Dred Scott was 
not an interpretation of the Constitution, but a perversion of it. 
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concur-
rence of the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias ... it then 
might be, perhaps would be, factious, even revolutionary, to not acqui-
esce in it as a precedent. But when, as it is true, we find it wanting in 
all these claims to the public confidence, it is not resistance, it is not 
factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat it as not having yet quite 
established a settled doctrine for the country. 
And yet, even at that moment, Lincoln would not call for defiance of 
the Court, but rather for patience in awaiting a new decision. "We do 
not propose that when Dred Scott is decided to be a slave, that we will 
raise a mob to make him free," Lincoln warned during the Lincoln-
Douglas debates, "If ... there be any man in the republican party who 
is impatient of ... the constitutional obligations bound around it, he is 
misplaced, and ought to find a place somewhere else." This is not what 
we expect to hear from a man who sits lightly by the Constitution. But 
it is what we expect to hear from one who believes that the Constitu-
tion was written to pursue, more than just procedural goals, a set of 
moral goals. 28 
III 
For Lincoln, the place of the Declaration of Independence as an apple of 
gold was not intended to diminish the importance of the Constitution as 
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a picture of silver; nor was a description of the Constitution as a means 
to realizing the goals set out in the Declaration a way of writing off the 
Constitution. Much as he appt!aled to Douglas's followers in 1856 to 
"Throw off these·things, and come to the rescue of this great principle 
of equality," he also'<!dded, "Don't interfere with anything in the Con-
stitution. That must be maintained, for it is the only safeguard of our 
liberties." Nor was he exaggerating for political effect when, en route 
to his inauguration in 1861, he remarked, "When I shall speak author-
itatively, I hope to say nothing inconsistent with the Constitution, the 
union, the rights of all the States, of each State, and of each section of 
the country." Moreover, as an "old Henry Clay Whig," he persisted in 
taking a minimalist vit!w of his own powers as president under the 
Constitution. "My political education strongly inclines me against a 
very free use of any of these means, by the Executive, to control the 
legislation of the country. As a rule, I think it better that congress 
should originate, as well as perfect its measures, without external 
bias. "29 
The tragedy of what happened with the secession of the Southern 
states and the beginning of the Civil War was· that, with such views of 
the Constitution, Lincoln as president was actually a better safeguard for 
the continued existence of slavery in the South than secession. If it were 
a case, Lincoln explained in his First Inaugural, where a majority was 
forcibly depriving a minority of their constitutional rights, secession-or 
rather, revolution-might well be justified. "But such is not our case. All 
the vital rights of minorities, and of individuals, are so plainly assured to 
them ... in the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning 
them." Nor should they be worried that his private intentions might 
somehow subvert these rights. "By the frame of the government-under 
which we live, this same people have wisely given their public servants 
but little power, for mischief; and have, with equaL wisdom, provided for 
the"return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals." Just 
as only Nixon could have gone to China, only Lincoln, with the moral 
weight of the Republican party, could have enforced national respect for 
the Constitutional safeguards that prevented interference with Southern 
slavery.30 
But this did not happen, and secession plunged the nation into a 
situation for which the Constitution granted little guidance. Just as"the 
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Constitution granted no right to secede, it granted the president nodi-
rection about how to proceed with the seceders. His guiding star in 
that case, however, was not the Declaration, but again the Constitu-
tion, and his insistence that the Constitution was permanent and un-
breakable. "My opinion is that no state can, in any way lawfully, get 
out of the Union, without the consent of the others," he told Thurlow 
Weed in 1860, "and that it is the duty of the President, and other gov-
ernment functionaries to run the machine as it is." Just as slavery was 
a violation of the spirit of the Declaration, secession was a violation of 
the whole idea of constitutional government. "A majority, held in re-
straint by constitutional checks, and limitations, and always changing, 
with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only 
true sovereign of a free people." But secession was an insult to the no-
tion of majority rule and constitutional government, a flight "to anar-
chy or despotism." 31 
The constitutional uncertainties of dealing with secession led Lincoln 
into a series of actions in the spring of 1861 that were, by his own public 
admission, of debatable constitutionality in peacetime: suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus, authorizing the raising of a national army, spend-
ing public money to buy supplies, imposing a blockade. What Lincoln 
reminded his critics was that this was not peacetime, but war, and war of 
such a nature that no one who wrote the Constitution had ever antici-
pated, and war that had broken out while Congress was not only in be-
tween sessions, but which was in fact still in the midst of completing 
Congressional elections. (Lincoln's decision in April not to call a special 
session of Congress before July 4, 1861, was dictated in large measure 
by the fact that, under the old staggered system of congressional elec-. 
tions, a number of key border-state Congressional districts had not yet 
finished balloting for new representatives.) When the western counties of 
Virginia organized their own Provisional Government of Virginia, and 
then plunged ahead to petition for separate statehood, Lincoln was 
equally reluctant to sanction what amounted to a disregarding of the 
Constitution's prohibition on setting up new states out of old ones with-
out the old state's approval (Article 4, section 3) and to discourage a loy-
alist movement which had been formed at great hazard to support Con-
stitutional government. He was forced finally to come down on the side 
of the West Virginians-not, significantly, because they represented the 
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triumph of egalitarianism (the West Virginia state constitution actually 
provided for a gradual emancipation, rather than the full emancipation 
Lincoln had already announced as his policy for states still in rebellion), 
but because their movement represented the spirit of the Constitution, if 
not its precise specification. There is a difference, Lincoln observed, "be-
tween secession against the constitution, and secession in favor of the 
constitution," and there was nothing unconstitutional in taking notice of 
the difference. "It is said," Lincoln concluded, "the devil takes care of 
his own. Much more should a good spirit-the spirit of the Constitu-
tion-take care of its own. I think it can not do less, and live."32 Simi-
larly, the exigencies of the war meant that the executive branch of the 
government swelled to gargantuan size under Lincoln's administration, 
leading Lincoln's critics to claim that Lincoln was the original author of 
"big government." But these charges generally miss how dramatically 
the federal government shrank back to its prewar proportions after 
1865, and stayed that way for another half-century. Congress, fully as 
much as the executive branch, filled the role of "big government" during 
the war: each wartime Congress, the 37th and 38th, each doubled the 
number of bills passed by the record 27th Congress of 1841-1843.33 
It also needs remembering how comparatively limited Lincoln's 
early extra-Constitutional wartime gestures were. The original uni-
lateral suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus were only operative 
in areas of military confrontation; the recruiting and supplying of the 
armies were submitted to Congress for post facto approval, and, de-
spite the clamor of offended Democrats during the war, wartime ar-
rests and limitations of civil liberties were extraordinarily few, espe-
cially by comparison with the Red Scares and wholesale confinement 
of Japanese-Americans in this century's American wars. And one 
good measure of Lincoln's cautious constitutionalism is the care with 
which he strove to justify even these measures. He was meticulous in 
seeking out legal opinions to support actions as commander in chief 
as minor as the appointment of a temperance representative as an of-
ficer or the remission of a fine imposed on a restaurant owner for 
selling brandy to a wounded soldier; he rigidly segregated decisions 
that he believed as commander in chief he needed to take to "best 
subdue the enemy" from meddling in "the permanent legislative 
functions of the government. "34 
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Like his Whig predecessors, Lincoln was troubled by any expansion 
of government built on nothing more than raw executive power. The 
adoption of measures on the sole ground that "I think the measure politi-
cally expedient, and morally right" bothered Lincoln. "Would I not thus 
give up all footing upon constitution or law? Would I not thus be in the 
boundless field of absolutism? Would it not lose us ... the very cause we 
seek to advance?" And he submitted himself to the most obvious of all 
tests of constitutionality, the reelection campaign of 1864, which he could 
easily have suspended by bayonet, but which never seems even to have 
crossed his mind as a possibility. In fact, his only recorded discussion 
about a response to an unfavorable electoral verdict was the extraction of 
a promise from all his cabinet that they would abide by the legal results. 
As Don Fehrenbacher remarked, "he placed the principle of self-govern-
ment above even his passion for the Union" and "affirmed his adherence 
to the most critical and most fragile principle in the democratic process-
namely, the requirement of minority submission to majority will. "35 
It was, in fact, a matter of frustration to the most radical members of 
Lincoln's own party that he seemed so unwilling to step out from behind 
the Constitution and deal with the Confederate states as they thought he 
ought. Despite the clamor of Charles Sumner, Ben Wade, and Zachariah 
Chandler in Congress, Lincoln never seriously entertained any notion of 
destroying the identity of the rebel states, and aimed at a speedy recon-
struction with those state identities intact. He issued the Emancipation 
Proclamation only after he had satisfied his own mind that it could be 
applied strictly as a military measure, under his own authority as com-
mander-in-chief in time of war, and only with strict application to those 
parts of the Confederacy still in actual rebellion. 
Even then, his preface to the Proclamation identified its "object" as 
"practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United 
States, and each of the states ... in which states that relation is, or may 
be suspended, or disturbed." (He refused, for instance, Salmon Chase's 
urging to extend the Proclamation to federally occupied parts of Vir-
ginia and Louisiana on the grounds that these areas were no longer 
under his purview as military zones, and that the Proclamation "has no 
constitutional or legal justification, except as a military measure.") He 
admitted to Alexander Stephens at the Hampton Roads Conference in 
February 1865, 
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that as the proclamation was a war measure and would have effect 
only from its being an exercise of the war power, as soon as the war 
ceased, it would be inoperative for the future. It would be held to 
apply only to such slaves as had come under its operation while it was 
in active exercise .... So far as he was concerned, he should leave it to 
the courts to decide. 
He appeared, as Mark Neely has remarked, "to some antislavery advo-
cates at the time and to many historians since to have been strangely 
stricken with a p·aralyzing constitutional scrupulousness." Conscious of 
his constitutional limitations as president, rather than simply attempt to 
enforce it by bayonet, Lincoln turned in 1864 to having emancipation, 
in more sweeping form, written into the Constitution as the Thirteenth 
Amendment. It is hardly likely that a "dictator," or an egalitarian ideo-
logue who believed that the Declaration of Independence trumped all 
questions, would even have bothered.36 
There is no easy formula for describing the living connection be-
tween Lincoln's well-known awe for the Declaration and his restrained 
constitutionalism. It is doubtful whether he himself had one, at least ex-
plicitly, and his best effort at describing it was only a biblical metaphor. 
He had no constitutional theory as such, if only because he believed 
that the original intent of the founders was actually quite easy to dis-
cover in the text of the Constitution and in the writings of the 
founders-which, preeminently, included the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. But he was convinced that such a connection existed, that as the 
Declaration set out a political ideal for. all Americans, the Constitution 
remained the single greatest vehicle for realizing, implementing, and oc-
casionally restraining that ideal. 
This qoes not make Lincoln, by any stretch of the imagination, into 
either Kendall's or Wills's closet revolutionary, undermining a Constitu-
tion that he resented as an obstacle to either ambition or liberty. Gideon 
Welles, Lincoln's secretary of the navy and a former Democrat who was 
keen to scent Republican improprieties, remarked that: 
Mr. Lincoln ... though nominally a Whig in the ·past, had respect for 
the Constitution, loved the federal Union, and had a sacred regard for 
the rights of the States .... War two years after secession brought 
emancipation, but emancipation did not dissolve the Union, consoli-
APPLE OP GoLD IN A PICTURE OP SILVER. 
date the Government, or clothe it with absolute power; nor did it im-
pair the authority and rights which the States had reserved. Emancipa-
tion was a necessary, not a revolutionary measure, forced upon the 
Administration by the secessionists themselves, who insisted that slav-
ery which was local and sectional should be made national. 
I07 
It is one of the great oddities of modern American life that (as Michael 
Sandel has written) our political discourse has tended to follow not the 
path of Lincoln, but the. path of Stephen A. Douglas, toward insisting 
that the Constitution provides only a procedural framewor:k in which 
morally unencumb~red individu~ls scream·in protest at·any attempt to 
"legislatthlorality." To the extent that Sandel is right, perhaps Abra-
ham Lincoln is a revolutionary after all, for our times, if not for his 
own.37 
